If you proved that Collatz was not disprovable in (say) PA, this would mean that there were no _finite cycles_ not hitting $1$. However, it would leave open the possibility that there was some number $n$ which never hit $1$, and never entered a finite cycle (just "shot off to infinity"); so this wouldn't actually prove the Collatz conjecture.
I believe there have been no serious attempts at proving Collatz to be unprovable in PA (or related theories). The problem is that we only know a small handful of techniques for showing PA-unprovability, and none of them seem to apply to Collatz. _Proving unprovability is extremely hard._
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Incidentally, the statements for which PA-unprovability implies truth are those which are equivalent in PA to a $\Pi^0_1$ sentence; it is not known whether the Collatz conjecture is equivalent over PA to a $\Pi^0_1$ sentence, so currently no way is known for turning a proof of the PA-undisprovability of Collatz into a proof of the Collatz conjecture.